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Abstract
Background: Nations are struggling to expand access to essential medications while curbing rising health and drug
spending. While the US government’s Medicare Part D drug insurance benefit expanded elderly citizens’ access to drugs, it
also includes a controversial period called the ‘‘coverage gap’’ during which beneficiaries are fully responsible for drug costs.
We examined the impact of entering the coverage gap on drug discontinuation, switching to another drug for the same
indication, and drug adherence. While increased discontinuation of and adherence to essential medications is a regrettable
response, increased switching to less expensive but therapeutically interchangeable medications is a positive response to
minimize costs.
Methods and Findings: We followed 663,850 Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D or retiree drug plans with
prescription and health claims in 2006 and/or 2007 to determine who reached the gap spending threshold, n=217,131
(33%). In multivariate Cox proportional hazards models, we compared drug discontinuation and switching rates in selected
drug classes after reaching the threshold between all 1,993 who had no financial assistance during the coverage gap
(exposed) versus 9,965 multivariate propensity score-matched comparators with financial assistance (unexposed).
Multivariate logistic regressions compared drug adherence (#80% versus .80% of days covered). Beneficiaries reached
the gap spending threshold on average 222 d 679. At the drug level, exposed beneficiaries were twice as likely to
discontinue (hazard ratio [HR] =2.00, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.64–2.43) but less likely to switch a drug (HR =0.60,
0.46–0.78) after reaching the threshold. Gap-exposed beneficiaries were slightly more likely to have reduced adherence (OR
=1.07, 0.98–1.18).
Conclusions: A lack of financial assistance after reaching the gap spending threshold was associated with a doubling in
discontinuing essential medications but not switching drugs in 2006 and 2007. Blunt cost-containment features such as the
coverage gap have an adverse impact on drug utilization that may conceivably affect health outcomes.
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Internationally, governments are wrestling with the seemingly
contradictory goals of expanding citizens’ access to essential
medications while at the same time controlling rising drug costs.
Multiple benefit designs have been proposed and implemented by
diverse countries such as Canada, China, Australia, Germany, and
the United Kingdom, including reference pricing [1,2], generic
substitution [3], income-based deductibles [4], copayments and
coinsurance [5,6], incentive-based tiered formularies [7], negative
and positive subsidy lists [8], prescribing budgets [9,10], and drug
caps [11], each with varied success. In 2006, the US government
expanded its Medicare health insurance program for the elderly to
offer a prescription drug insurance benefit, Medicare Part D. Part
D’s goal was to improve beneficiaries’ access to and the
affordability of essential medications, but the US government
was also mindful of the program’s budgetary impact. Therefore,
the standard Part D benefit design included a novel cost
containment feature, the ‘‘coverage gap.’’
After drug spending reaches an initial threshold ($2,830 in 2010)
in a calendar year, beneficiaries enter the coverage gap, a period
during which they are responsible for 100% of drug costs.
Beneficiaries remain in the coverage gap period until out-of-pocket
drug spending reaches a catastrophic coverage spending threshold
($4,550 in 2010) at which time cost-sharing is dramatically
reduced, or until the benefit resets at the next calendar year
[12]. Of note, low-income beneficiaries receive subsidies to help
them pay for drugs and thus are not 100% responsible for their
drug costs during the coverage gap period.
Between 2.9–3.8 million (11%–14%) Medicare Part D benefi-
ciaries reach the coverage gap each year and receive no financial
assistance to help pay for drugs during this period [13,14].
Proponents have argued that the coverage gap could help both
beneficiaries and the US health care system save money by
increasing beneficiaries’ awareness of medication costs and
encouraging switching to or new selection of cost-effective
therapeutic options [15]. Critics point to evidence that similar
drug caps and increases in cost-sharing have been associated with
decreased drug utilization, increased health services use, and
adverse outcomes [6,11,16–18].
To date, researchers have observed reduced drug utilization and
adherence among beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage
plans who reach the coverage gap spending threshold and had no
financial assistance to pay for drugs [19–22]. Zhang et al. noted a
14% reduction in drug utilization among beneficiaries with no
financial assistance during the coverage gap [22]. These
beneficiaries also reduced their adherence to chronic medications
3%–8% during the coverage gap compared to the precoverage
gap period [20] and were 17% less likely than beneficiaries who
had financial assistance to be adherent to their medications during
the coverage gap period [19]. While important contributions to
the field, results from these Medicare Advantage-based studies
may not be generalizable to the 70% of all Part D beneficiaries
enrolled in stand-alone Part D plans [23]. Unlike stand-alone
plans that only provide drug coverage, Medicare Advantage plans
manage health and drug insurance benefits, and so may have
different incentives in terms of coverage and benefit design. The
remaining study of beneficiaries’ coverage gap behavior found that
among those who reached the coverage gap, 20% discontinued,
switched, or reduced their medication use [13]. However, this
study did not employ a comparator group nor link prescription
data to clinical information, both important steps in establishing
baseline rates of utilization and minimizing confounding.
In this study, we used nationally representative cohorts of
Medicare beneficiaries who enrolled in one of 182 stand-alone
Part D plans or in retiree plans with drug coverage. We assessed
the characteristics of beneficiaries who reached the coverage gap
spending threshold and determined their time to reach the
threshold. Among those who reached the threshold, we compared
rates of drug discontinuation and switching and the odds of
reduced drug adherence between those who were 100%
responsible for their drug costs during the coverage gap and those
who received financial assistance to pay for drugs during this time.
We hypothesized that compared to beneficiaries who received
financial assistance, beneficiaries who were fully responsible for
their drug costs during the coverage gap would be more likely to
discontinue medications but less likely to switch from one
medication to a second, potentially less costly medication with
the same indication for use. We also hypothesized that
beneficiaries would be less adherent to their medications if they
had no financial assistance during the gap. Our study aimed to
provide information about the coverage gap’s influence on
beneficiaries’ drug utilization behaviors and to evaluate the
applicability of the coverage gap design to other insurance settings.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The Human Subjects Committee at Brigham and Women’s
Hospital approved this study. Because the study was a secondary
analysis of previously collected data, both written and oral consent
requirements were waived. Data use agreements were in place
with all data providers.
Data Sources and Study Population
We studied community-dwelling, fee-for-service Medicare
beneficiaries with prescription drug coverage through either a
stand-alone Part D plan or a retiree drug plan in 2006 or 2007 that
was administered by CVS Caremark, a pharmacy benefits
management company that adjudicates approximately 660 million
prescriptions per year [24]. Medicare beneficiaries’ Caremark
prescription drug claims were linked to Medicare Parts A, B, and
enrollment data to obtain diagnostic, health care utilization, and
demographic information. Part D plans were characterized as
providing no or generic-only drug coverage during the coverage
gap. None of the retiree plans had a coverage gap feature.
We established two cohorts of beneficiaries age 65 or older.
Because Part D did not begin until 2006, beneficiaries in the
‘‘Early Part D’’ cohort (2005–2006) had no Caremark drug claims
for 2005, the baseline year, but had claims in the study year, 2006.
Therefore, we required $1 prescription claim in 2006. Beneficia-
ries in the ‘‘Established Part D’’ cohort (2006–2007) had
continuous Caremark eligibility and $1 prescription drug claim
in both the baseline, 2006, and the study year, 2007. Both cohorts
had Medicare eligibility and $1 inpatient or outpatient health
care claim in both the baseline and study years.
We used plan enrollment and beneficiaries’ out-of-pocket drug
spending in the study year to categorize beneficiaries into four
groups. Of the three Part D groups, two received subsidies to
defray cost-sharing. Full subsidy beneficiaries had incomes
#$7,500 in 2006 or #$7,620 in 2007 and per prescription cost-
sharing that did not exceed $5 in 2006 or $5.35 in 2007, even
when in the coverage gap. Partial subsidy beneficiaries had higher
incomes ($7,501–$11,500 in 2006, $7,620–$11,710 in 2007) and
cost-sharing #15% for each prescription in both the initial
coverage and coverage gap periods. In contrast, the third Part D
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responsible for 100% of drug costs in the coverage gap. Retirees
enrolled in retiree plans, none of which had a coverage gap design
or benefit cap, comprised the final group and thus always had
financial assistance to pay for drugs. Assignment algorithm details
are in Text S1.
We hypothesized that a beneficiary’s plan enrollment and
subsequent drug utilization were good predictors of whether he
would reach the coverage gap spending threshold; however,
baseline year drug use was not available for the Early Part D
cohort. To ensure comparable drug data from both cohorts, we
limited our cohorts to beneficiaries who reached the threshold
$60 d after plan enrollment.
In total, 663,850 beneficiaries met inclusion and exclusion
criteria. Using beneficiaries’ and plans’ drug spending in study
years 2006 and 2007, we further limited our primary study cohort
to the 217,131 (33%) beneficiaries who reached the coverage gap
spending threshold in each year (cumulative spending of $2,250 in
2006; $2,400 in 2007).
Study Design and Exposures
To assess drug utilization changes after reaching the coverage
gap spending threshold, we conducted two prospective open
cohort studies (Figure 1). In both cohorts, baseline covariates were
assessed in the 12 mo prior to plan enrollment. We classified
beneficiaries as ‘‘exposed’’ if they received no financial assistance
to pay for drug costs in the coverage gap (i.e., the nonsubsidy
enrollees), and ‘‘unexposed’’ otherwise (full subsidy, partial
subsidy, and retirees). If a nonsubsidy enrollee was in a Part D
plan with generic drug coverage during the coverage gap but was
responsible for 100% of branded drug costs, he was also classified
as exposed. In sensitivity analyses, these 12 beneficiaries with
generic drug coverage were removed. All beneficiaries entered the
study on the date when they reached the coverage gap spending
threshold and were censored on the date of a study outcome of
interest, death, nursing home admission, hospitalization .14 d,
reaching the catastrophic coverage spending threshold, or on
December 31 of the study year.
Covariate Assessment and Propensity Score Matching
We used two steps to balance measured covariate distributions
in the exposed and unexposed groups. First, we constructed a
propensity score (PS) that assessed each beneficiary’s propensity to
receive financial assistance to pay for drug costs upon reaching the
coverage gap spending threshold. PS models included age, gender,
race, region of the US, rural/urban residence, median household
income, Charlson comorbidity score [25], number of office-based
drug infusions, physician visits and hospitalizations, Medicare
inpatient and outpatient spending, diagnosis of cancer, rheuma-
toid arthritis (RA), cardiovascular conditions (atrial or ventricular
fibrillation, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, hypercholesterolemia,
myocardial infarction, angina, atherosclerosis, or congestive heart
failure), depression, dementia, and/or diabetes, all assessed in the
baseline year before a beneficiary enrolled in a Part D or retiree
plan. Each exposed beneficiary was PS matched to five unexposed
beneficiaries using a greedy matching algorithm [26]. PS model
results are in Text S1.
Second, we measured additional covariates in the postbaseline-
precoverage gap period. Beneficiaries’ utilization during this
period was likely a function of their health status, their drug
plan’s features, and their intuition as to whether they would reach
the coverage gap spending threshold. In the 6 mo prior to
reaching the threshold, we assessed the number of physician visits
and hospitalizations, the Charlson comorbidity score, and days to
reach the coverage gap spending threshold. In the 2 mo prior, we
determined the number of unique drugs used and total drug
spending. Follow-up for the adjusted analyses also began after
beneficiaries reached the coverage gap spending threshold.
Outcomes
We considered three outcomes, drug discontinuation, switching,
and adherence, after a beneficiary reached the coverage gap
spending threshold. We included any drug with available days’
supply on the exposure date (date beneficiary reached the
coverage gap spending threshold) for analysis, and only the first
outcome observed on or after cohort entry was considered. In a
first set of analyses, the unit of analysis was at the drug level. Drug
X was discontinued if .30 d elapsed during the coverage gap
when no drug X was available and no further fills of drug X were
made during the coverage gap period. Drug X was switched if a
beneficiary entered the coverage gap and switched from the
generic to the brand version of drug X or vice versa, or stopped
filling prescriptions for drug X but filled a new prescription for a
drug with the same indication as drug X within 30 d after the days’
supply of drug X was exhausted. Text S1 details acceptable
switches. Drug adherence was measured using the proportion of
days covered (PDC) [27], the number of drug X days supply
available from cohort entry until censoring divided by the number
of days from cohort entry until censoring. A beneficiary was
considered adherent to drug X if PDC.80% and nonadherent
otherwise.
For a second set of analyses at the beneficiary level, where a
beneficiary might be taking one or more drugs, a beneficiary
discontinued drugs if at least one of his available drugs was
discontinued as described above. The beneficiary’s date of
discontinuation was the first date after reaching the coverage
gap spending threshold on which there was no days’ supply of the
discontinued drug +30-d grace period. A beneficiary switched
drugs if at least one of his available drugs was switched according
to the definition above, with the switching date defined as the date
of the first switch after cohort entry. Drug adherence was defined
as a PDC $80% for all drugs a beneficiary was taking [28]. In
sensitivity analyses at the drug and beneficiary level, we considered
discontinuations and switches within 15 d and 45 d.
We focused on drugs used to treat one of five diseases of interest:
RA, cardiovascular conditions, diabetes, depression, or dementia,
each described in Text S1. Self-injected drugs to treat RA are
covered under Part D and their expense may move beneficiaries
quickly into the coverage gap, while parenteral drugs are covered
by the government [12]. Beneficiaries in the coverage gap may
switch to parenteral drugs. Many drugs used to treat cardiovas-
cular conditions, diabetes, and depression are available as lower-
cost generics, so using generics may delay coverage gap entry,
while switching to generics after coverage gap entry may reduce
costs and minimize discontinuation. Finally, drugs to treat
dementia are typically branded and expensive and questions
persist as to their efficacy [29,30].
Statistical Analysis
Among our primary cohort who reached the coverage gap
spending threshold, we cross-tabulated beneficiaries’ characteris-
tics at baseline by benefit group (full, partial, and nonsubsidy
enrollees, retirees) and exposure status. We calculated the average
time to reach the threshold among all beneficiaries and by
beneficiary group, the proportion of beneficiaries who reached the
threshold each month, and their top ten diagnoses.
Among exposed beneficiaries and multivariate PS-matched
unexposed beneficiaries and with additional adjustment for
Drug Utilization Changes in the Part D Coverage Gap
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of drug discontinuation and drug switching for each drug (drug-
level analyses) using Cox proportional hazards models [31] and
the odds of reduced drug adherence using logistic regression. As a
sensitivity analysis to investigate concerns that the interdepen-
dence of the discontinuation and switching outcomes would result
in overestimates of the hazards for each, we performed a
competing risks analysis and calculated cumulative incidences
and then the cumulative incidence ratio for each outcome,
comparing the exposed with the unexposed [32,33]. In beneficia-
ry-level analyses, we ran stratified Cox proportional hazards
models for the discontinuation and switching outcomes to allow
for potentially different hazards among those taking various
numbers of drugs. We used multivariate adjusted logistic
regression to assess reduced drug adherence. In all beneficiary-
level analyses, we employed robust standard errors to adjust for the
correlation among multiple drugs used per person [34]. Subgroup
analyses explored effect modification by drug class and generic/
branded status, as measured by a Wald’s test for the interaction.
After testing for effect modification by cohort using a Wald’s test
for the interaction term, we also conducted pooled cohort
analyses, estimating robust standard errors to account for
correlation between beneficiaries present in both cohorts (drug-
level and beneficiary-level analyses) as well as among multiple
drugs used per person (beneficiary-level analyses) [34]. Finally, to
estimate the population-level impact of exposure (having no
financial assistance to help pay for drugs) during the coverage gap
period, we calculated the covariate-adjusted rate differences for
beneficiary-level drug discontinuation and switching between the
exposed and unexposed in the pooled cohort using Poisson
regression with robust standard errors. We then multiplied the rate
differences for each outcome by the 11% prevalence of exposure
and average 3.6-mo duration of the coverage gap as described by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services [14]. The
resulting estimates give the number and percentage of beneficiaries
per year who would have a particular outcome in the total
Medicare Part D beneficiary population due to exposure in the
coverage gap period.
Results
Among the 121,760 Early Part D and 95,371 Established Part
D cohort beneficiaries who reached the coverage gap spending
threshold, there were covariate imbalances across beneficiary
groups, for example, female gender in the Early Part D cohort
(76% of full subsidy versus 68% of partial subsidy, 64% of
nonsubsidy enrollees, and 58% of retirees) and white race in 2006
(72% of full subsidy versus 93% of partial subsidy, 96%
nonsubsidy enrollees, and 94% of retirees) (Table 1). There was
a high prevalence of cardiovascular conditions (91%–95%) and
diabetes (37%–56%) across groups. In the Established Part D
cohort, the number of unique medications used in the baseline
year varied from 561 among nonsubsidy enrollees to 964 among
retirees.
The top inpatient or outpatient diagnoses among beneficiaries
who reached the coverage gap spending threshold in each 30-d
period were remarkably consistent: anemia, chest pain, coronary
atherosclerosis, uncontrolled diabetes, hypertension, hyperlipide-
mia, hypercholesterolemia, musculoskeletal pain, shortness of
breath, and other malaise and fatigue (unpublished data).
In both 2006 and 2007, retirees reached the coverage gap
spending threshold most quickly (Figures 2A and 2B), at an
average of 215680 d in 2006, whereas nonsubsidy enrollees took
an average of 275657 d in 2006. While the proportion of full
subsidy, partial subsidy, and retirees’ entering the coverage gap
each month remained level over time, an increasing proportion of
Figure 1. Prospective open cohort study design.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001075.g001
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September =12%, October =21% in 2007.
After PS matching, the measured covariate distributions were
largely balanced between exposed and unexposed beneficiaries,
with few residual differences (Table 2).
In drug-level PS-matched analyses additionally adjusted for
postbaseline–precoverage gap covariates, exposed beneficiaries
were 2.00 (95% confidence interval [CI] 1.64–2.43) times more
likely to discontinue a drug after reaching the coverage gap
spending threshold than were unexposed beneficiaries (pooled
cohort analyses, Table 3). There was a 2-fold increased hazard
(hazard ratio [HR] =2.06, 1.68–2.53) of discontinuing cardio-
vascular drugs but no greater hazard of discontinuing oral
hypoglycemic drugs (HR =1.86, 0.95–3.62). Exposed beneficia-
ries were 2.63 (1.93–3.58) times more likely to discontinue a
branded cardiovascular drug but 1.79 (1.38–2.32) times more
likely to discontinue a generic cardiovascular drug.
Although they discontinued drugs more often, exposed
beneficiaries were less likely to switch a drug after reaching the
coverage gap spending threshold than were unexposed beneficia-
ries, HR =0.60 (0.46–0.78). This decreased hazard of switching
was consistent for cardiovascular drugs, HR =0.57 (0.41–0.79)
but inconclusive for the oral hypoglycemic drugs, HR =0.59
(0.30–1.15). Exposed beneficiaries were 57% less likely to switch
from a branded cardiovascular drug to a generic cardiovascular
drug (0.22–0.84) than were unexposed beneficiaries. In the
sensitivity analysis that accounted for the competing risk of drug
discontinuation, exposed beneficiaries were also less likely to
switch a drug after reaching the threshold than were unexposed
beneficiaries, risk ratio =0.51 (unpublished data). Exposed
beneficiaries showed increased odds of nonadherence to a drug
after reaching the coverage gap as compared to unexposed
beneficiaries, OR =1.07 (0.98–1.18), but these results were not
significant. Sensitivity analyses with 15- and 45-d grace periods did
not change discontinuation or switching results.
In beneficiary-level analyses (Table 4), exposed beneficiaries
had a 1.72 (1.36–2.16) times increased hazard of discontinuing at
least one drug but a 40% (0.44–0.83) decreased hazard of
switching at least one drug during the coverage gap period as
compared to the unexposed, and 1.18 (1.05–1.32) times as likely to
have decreased adherence for all their drugs as compared to the
unexposed. When extrapolated to the larger population of all
Medicare beneficiaries, entry into the coverage gap period with a
lack of financial assistance to pay for drugs resulted in an
additional 18,007 (9,432–33,442) beneficiaries (0.07%; 0.04%–
0.13%) discontinuing at least one drug per year and 48,020
(40,302–54,880) fewer beneficiaries (0.18%; 0.15%–0.21%)
switching at least one drug per year.
Discussion
In this paper we have shown that one-third of Medicare
beneficiaries reached the coverage gap spending threshold in an
average of 7 mo after enrollment. Beneficiaries who received no
financial assistance to help pay drug costs after reaching the
threshold were two times more likely to discontinue a drug but
were 40% less likely to switch a drug compared to beneficiaries
who did receive financial assistance. After accounting for a
beneficiary’s complete drug regimen, beneficiaries who received
no financial assistance were 18% more likely to reduce their drug
adherence. These surprising findings mean that when faced with
the responsibility of paying 100% of their drug costs, beneficiaries
discontinued therapy frequently or reduced adherence but were
less likely to switch to less expensive or generic drugs. Among the
cardiovascular drugs, there was a 2.6-fold increased likelihood of
discontinuing a branded cardiovascular drug and a 1.8-fold
increased likelihood of discontinuing a generic cardiovascular drug
but no effect modification by brand/generic status. These results
strongly suggest that increased discontinuation rates among the
exposed were not driven by drug price alone.
Recent trends in drug insurance design have focused on
making consumers more sensitive to drug costs. Our results
demonstrate that while a blunt cost-sharing mechanism like the
coverage gap does raise consumer sensitivity, it produces
surprising consequences. Instead of incentivizing beneficiaries to
switch to lower-priced or generic drugs, entry into the coverage
gap resulted in an abrupt discontinuation of or reduced
adherence to drugs among elderly Medicare beneficiaries. These
results echo those of other studies that demonstrated that blunt
measures had adverse effects on drug utilization and adherence
[6,16,17] and are also in line with findings from Medicare
Advantage Part D studies that observed increased rates of drug
discontinuation [19,20,22] and adherence [19–21] but did not
observe higher rates of drug switching to generics [22] during the
coverage gap. A growing body of literature from diverse settings
describes the adverse clinical consequences of stopping or
reducing adherence to drugs in response to drug benefit caps,
gaps in coverage, and high deductibles. [6,17,35,36]. For
example, abrupt increases in drug cost-sharing in Quebec,
Canada resulted in a 9% decrease in essential drug use and a
7% increase in serious adverse events.[6]. A three-drug per
month reimbursement limit on elderly Medicaid patients in New
Hampshire resulted in a doubling of nursing home admission
rates compared to a comparator US state [36]. In Germany,
physicians who were required to pay for drug costs that exceeded
a fixed budget discontinued their patients’ medications more
frequently, and these discontinuations may have led to increased
hospitalization rates [37,38]. Taiwan observed 2%–10% decreas-
es in prescription costs and prescriptions when it introduced flat
reimbursement rates to prescribing physicians [1].
An alternative strategy that may help beneficiaries forestall
entry into the coverage gap is the initial prescription of generic or
preferred medications, which has been associated with lower costs
and better adherence over time [2,39]. In British Columbia,
introduction of a reference-drug program for angiotensin-convert-
ing enzyme (ACE) inhibitors was associated with a 24% decrease
in drug discontinuation, no changes in health status or health
systems use, and government savings of $6.7 million during the
first year [2,40,41]. Value-based insurance design (VBID), in
which patients’ cost-sharing is reduced for medications that
provide high benefits relative to costs, is a second potential
strategy. Recent US studies observed 3%–4% increases in
adherence when copayments for chronic medications were
substantially reduced or eliminated [42,43].
Our study has several strengths that enhance the validity of
findings. Unlike previous studies [13,20,21,22], we used multivar-
iate PS-matched cohorts and additional adjustment for drug use
and drug spending just prior to the coverage gap spending
threshold. These measures strengthen our ability to compare
beneficiaries who did and did not experience a gap in coverage.
While unmeasured confounding may remain because of the
limitations of the PS technique, its combined effect would need to
be very strong to explain away the magnitude of the effect we
observed [44]. For example, to explain even the 64% increased
risk of drug discontinuation, the lower bound of the 95% CI, the
odds of association between the unmeasured confounder and
exposure would have to be at least an unrealistic 38.1, assuming a
prevalence of the unmeasured confounder of 20% and a relative
Drug Utilization Changes in the Part D Coverage Gap
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drug discontinuation (see Text S1 for calculations). Ours is also the
first study to use linked prescription and health care claims from
beneficiaries enrolled in heterogeneous stand-alone Part D plans
and as such, our findings are generalizable to the 70% of Part D
beneficiaries enrolled in such plans [23].
Table 1. Baseline characteristics of 217,131 beneficiaries who reached the coverage gap spending threshold, by exposure status
and benefit group.
Characteristics Early Part D Cohort, 2005–2006, n=121,760 Established Part D Cohort, 2006–2007, n=95,371
Exposed Unexposed Exposed Unexposed
Nonsubsidy Full Subsidy
Partial
Subsidy Retirees Nonsubsidy Full Subsidy
Partial
Subsidy Retirees
n (%) or mean 6 SD unless
otherwise noted
n 1,084 19,255 1,699 99,722 909 15,120 1,751 77,951
Female gender 689 (64) 14,634 (76) 1,153 (68) 56,754 (57) 603 (66) 11,464 (76) 1,153 (66) 43,959 (56)
Age (y) as of January 1, 2006 77677 7 687 6 677 6 677 7 677 6 677 7 677 6 67
65–74 485 (45) 8,538 (44) 793 (47) 47,478 (48) 354 (39) 7,048 (47) 772 (44) 36,024 (46)
75–84 433 (40) 7,406 (38) 659 (39) 41,904 (42) 395 (43) 5,618 (37) 679 (39) 33,179 (43)
85+ 166 (15) 3,311 (17) 247 (15) 10,340 (10) 160 (18) 2,454 (16) 300 (17) 8748 (11)
Race
White 1,041 (96) 13,805 (72) 1,584 (93) 93,907 (94) 878 (97) 11,049 (73) 1,619 (92) 73,908 (95)
Black 30 (3) 3676 (19) 65 (4) 4,472 (4) 20 (2) 2,655 (18) 97 (6) 2,950 (4)
Other 13 (1) 1,774 (9) 50 (3) 1,343 (1) 11 (1) 1,416 (9) 35 (2) 1,093 (1)
Region
Northeast 513 (47) 6,670 (35) 774 (46) 18,771 (19) 399 (44) 4,976 (33) 963 (55) 16,416 (21)
Central 210 (19) 5727 (30) 341 (20) 28,783 (29) 132 (15) 4,689 (31) 257 (15) 22,820 (29)
South 273 (25) 5,800 (30) 452 (27) 41,847 (42) 287 (32) 4,463 (30) 443 (25) 30,644 (39)
West 88 (8) 1,058 (5) 132 (8) 10,321 (10) 91 (10) 992 (7) 88 (5) 8,071 (10)
Urban residence 871 (80) 13,313 (69) 1,361 (80) 73,558 (74) 682 (75) 10,251 (68) 1,452 (83) 57,434 (74)
Median household income
(US$)
50,7086 38,8486 48,7246 45,5836 49,5586 39,4326 51,7596 45,3776
20,978 16,077 20,527 17,981 20,527 16,073 22,634 18,252
Total Medicare Parts A, B spending
in the baseline year (US$)
4,606 5,844 6,000 3,452 4,465 5,704 6,882 3,565
(Median; IQR) (1,959; 11,035) (2,190; 15,040) (2,479; 15,599) (1,466; 9,286) (2,012; 13,109) (2,187; 14,654) (2,877; 17,209) (1521; 9,647)
Charlson comorbidity score 2622 622 622 622 622 622 622 62
n physician visits 13610 14612 14612 10691 2 610 13611 15612 1069
n hospitalizations 0.361 0.461 0.4610 . 2 610 . 3 61 0.461 0.461 0.261
n office-based drug infusions 0.161 0.161 0.1610 . 1 610 . 1 61 0.161 0.161 0.161
n unique drugs — — — — 5616 636 639 64
Out-of-pocket drug spending
(median; IQR)
— — — — 794 51 946 561
(445; 1,336) (12; 81) (285; 1,645) (320; 973)
Plan drug spending (median; IQR) — — — — 902 2,604 1,094 3,055
(635; 1,160) (1,714; 3712) (698; 1,865) (2101; 4,429)
Diagnosis of cancer 223 (21) 2,470 (13) 303 (18) 17,929 (18) 175 (19) 1,946 (13) 342 (20) 14,153 (18)
Diagnosis of rheumatoid
arthritis
42 (4) 814 (4) 80 (5) 3,419 (3) 40 (4) 671 (4) 104 (6) 2,960 (3)
Diagnosis of cardiovascular
condition
1,014 (94) 18,089 (94) 1,589 (94) 90,452 (91) 844 (93) 14,230 (94) 1,665 (95) 70,892 (91)
Diagnosis of depression 123 (11) 5,204 (27) 337 (20) 10,193 (10) 98 (11) 3,861 (26) 321 (18) 8,279 (11)
Diagnosis of diabetes 436 (40) 10,729 (56) 832 (49) 36,394 (37) 349 (38) 8,501 (56) 859 (49) 29,736 (38)
Diagnosis of dementia 105 (10) 4,838 (25) 337 (20) 7,874 (8) 93 (10) 3,504 (23) 343 (20) 6,293 (8)
IQR, interquartile range; SD, standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001075.t001
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group. (B) Proportion of beneficiaries who reach the coverage gap spending threshold in each month in 2007, by beneficiary group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001075.g002
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discontinuation and switching outcomes was indeed responsible
for the opposite results of increased discontinuation but decreased
switching among the exposed compared to the unexposed, we
conducted a competing risks analysis. The competing risks analysis
confirmed our findings. Based on each outcome’s defined period of
follow-up, this is not surprising. Study follow-up for the
discontinuation outcome began 30 d after reaching the coverage
gap spending threshold in order to allow for each drug’s days
supply to run out, thus avoiding immortal person-time bias [45].
In contrast, study follow-up for the switching outcome began 1 d
after reaching the coverage gap spending threshold, as a drug
could be switched before the days supply ran out, so there were 29
additional d during which there was no competing risk of
discontinuation. Therefore, switching was not preempted by
discontinuation but rather appears to be undertaken indepen-
dently. It may be that beneficiaries who are aware that they will be
exposed if they reaching the coverage gap spending threshold
begin to switch their medications to lower-cost or generic versions
before rather than after reaching the threshold in order to prevent
or forestall coverage gap entry. However, surveys in 2006 and
2007 revealed that even when Part D beneficiaries were aware of
the coverage gap, they frequently indicated that they did not
understand how it worked or how to know whether they were at
risk of entering the gap, reducing the likelihood of this early
switching [46–48]. Again, these data suggest that when faced with
a blunt cost sharing mechanism like the coverage gap, exposed
beneficiaries were not able to navigate reducing their drug
spending through switching drugs but instead simply stopped
taking them.
In examining drug discontinuations and switches, other
modeling approaches, such as a multistate model, in which
beneficiaries could switch among the outcomes over time, are
possible [49]. However, we focused on the first drug utilization
change after a person enters the coverage gap because this first
change is most closely temporally associated and further
changes over time are less likely to be related. Because of the
sparseness of outcomes, we were unable to calculate HRs for
drug discontinuation and switching for several drug classes.
F i n a l l y ,d u r i n gt h ef i r s t3 m oo f2 0 0 6 ,m a n yP a r tDp l a n s
Table 2. Characteristics of multivariate propensity score-matched beneficiaries who reached the coverage gap spending threshold
in the Early Part D cohort, 2006, or the Established Part D cohort, 2007.
Characteristics
Early Part D Cohort, 2006
n=6,504
Established Part D Cohort, 2007
n=5,454
Exposed (No
Financial
Assistance)
n=1,084
Unexposed
(Receive
Financial
Assistance)
n=5,420 Delta
Exposed (No
Financial
Assistance)
n=909
Unexposed
(Receive
Financial
Assistance)
n=4,545 Delta
n (%) or mean 6 SD
Female gender 689 (64) 3,439 (63) 21% 603 (66) 2,996 (66) 0%
Age (y) as of January 1 of study year
65–74 485 (45) 2,312 (43) 22% 354 (39) 1,753 (39) 0%
75–84 433 (40) 2,253 (42) +2% 395 (43) 1,984 (44) +1%
85+ 166 (15) 855 (16) +1% 160 (18) 808 (18) 0%
Race
White 1,041 (96) 5,198 (96) 0% 878 (97) 4,401 (97) 0%
Black 30 (3) 156 (3) 0% 20 (2) 100 (2) 0%
Other 13 (1) 66 (1) 0% 11 (1) 44 (1) 0%
Region
Northeast 513 (47) 2,526 (47) 0% 399 (44) 1,998 (44) 0%
Midwest 210 (19) 1,085 (20) +1% 132 (15) 723 (16) +1%
South 273 (25) 1,415 (26) +1% 287 (32) 1,373 (30) 22%
West 88 (8) 394 (7) 21% 91 (10) 451 (10) 0%
Charlson comorbidity score 2622 62 0 points 2622 62 0 points
n physician visits 13610 13612 0 visits 12610 12611 0 visits
n hospitalizations 0.361 0.361 0 hospitalizations 0.3610 . 3 61 0 hospitalizations
n office-based drug infusions 0.161 0.161 0 infusions 0.1610 . 1 61 0 infusions
Diagnosis of cancer 223 (21) 1,111 (21) 0% 175 (19) 838 (18) 21%
Diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis 42 (4) 205 (4) 0% 40 (4) 235 (5) +1%
Diagnosis of cardiovascular condition 1,014 (94) 5,062 (93) 21% 844 (93) 4,253 (94) +1%
Diagnosis of depression 123 (11) 570 (11) 0% 98 (11) 468 (10) 21%
Diagnosis of diabetes 436 (40) 2,181 (40) 0% 349 (38) 1,750 (39) +1%
Diagnosis of dementia 105 (10) 527 (10) 0% 93 (10) 457 (10) 0%
SD, standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001075.t002
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beneficiaries into the new program. This was not the case in
2007. Therefore, in our pooled analyses, we may obscure
differences among beneficiaries who enrolled in Part D during
2006 versus 2007, although a test of heterogeneity by year did
not indicate a difference between years.
The adverse clinical consequences of stopping or reducing
adherence to essential medications can be both severe and costly.
Our results indicate that beneficiaries faced with increased out-of-
pocket cost burdens during the Part D coverage gap are twice as
likely to discontinue and more likely to reduce adherence to their
medications but not to switch medications. At the population level,
Table 3. Drug-level analyses.
Drug Changes HRs (95% CI)
Early Part D
Cohort, 2006
Established Part D Cohort,
2007 Pooled Cohorts
Exposed
(2,336)
a
Unexposed
(15,521)
a
Exposed
(1,841)
a
Unexposed
(13,037)
a
Exposed
(4,177)
a
Unexposed
(28,558)
a
Discontinue a drug 1.76 (1.34–2.32) 2.33 (1.76–3.08) 2.00 (1.64–2.43)
Discontinue a cardiovascular drug 1.94 (1.47–2.58) 2.20 (1.63–2.97) 2.06 (1.68–2.53)
Discontinue a branded cardiovascular drug 1.81 (1.18–2.77) 4.48 (2.82–7.13) 2.63 (1.93–3.58)
Discontinue a generic cardiovascular drug 2.02 (1.44–2.85) 1.51 (1.04–2.20) 1.79 (1.38–2.32)
Discontinue an oral hypoglycemic drug 0.60 (0.17–2.08) 4.51 (1.97–10.35) 1.86 (0.95–3.62)
Switch a drug 0.75 (0.54–1.03) 0.52 (0.37–0.73) 0.60 (0.46–0.78)
Switch a cardiovascular drug 0.69 (0.47–1.02) 0.40 (0.23–0.70) 0.57 (0.41–0.79)
Switch from a generic cardiovascular drug to a
branded cardiovascular drug
0.90 (0.36–2.23) 0.38 (0.05–2.91) 0.72 (0.31–1.63)
Switch from a branded cardiovascular drug to a
generic cardiovascular drug
0.50 (0.23–1.08) 0.25 (0.06–1.05) 0.43 (0.22–0.84)
Switch an oral hypoglycemic drug 1.08 (0.46–2.54) 0.32 (0.10–1.04) 0.59 (0.30–1.15)
Reduced adherence
b to a drug 1.03 (0.91–1.17) 1.12 (0.97–1.30) 1.07 (0.98–1.18)
Reduced adherence to a cardiovascular drug 1.01 (0.87–1.17) 1.11 (0.94–1.30) 1.05 (0.94–1.17)
Reduced adherence to an oral hypoglycemic drug 1.01 (0.68–1.50) 1.13 (0.72–1.78) 1.05 (0.78–1.42)
Covariate-adjusted hazards of changes in drug discontinuation, switching, and covariate-adjusted odds of reduced drug adherence after reaching the coverage gap
spending threshold among propensity score matched beneficiaries. Adjusted for the number of physician visits and hospitalizations, drugs used, drug spending, and
Charlson comorbidity score in the postbaseline, predoughnut hole period after propensity score matching for baseline characteristics, which included: age, gender,
race, region of the US, rural/urban residence, median household income, Charlson comorbidity score, number of office-based drug infusions, physician visits and
hospitalizations, Medicare Parts A and B spending, and diagnosis of cancer, RA, cardiovascular conditions (atrial or ventricular fibrillation, hypertension, hyperlipidemia,
hypercholesterolemia, myocardial infarction, angina, atherosclerosis, or congestive heart failure), depression, dementia, and/or diabetes.
an Drugs available at cohort entry.
bReduced adherence is defined as PDC ,80%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001075.t003
Table 4. Beneficiary-level analyses.
Drug Changes
Early Part D
Cohort, 2006 Established Part D Cohort, 2007 Pooled Cohorts
Exposed (897)
a
Unexposed
(4,769)
a Exposed (721)
a
Unexposed
(3,994)
a
Exposed
(1,618)
a
Unexposed
(8,763)
a
HRs (95% CI)
Discontinue $1 drug 1.63 (1.20–2.22) 1.79 (1.27–2.53) 1.72 (1.36–2.16)
Switch $1 drug 0.74 (0.51–1.07) 0.40 (0.22–0.74) 0.60 (0.44–0.83)
Odds ratios (95% CI)
Reduced adherence: adherence ,80%
for at least one drug
1.16 (0.99–1.35) 1.21 (1.02–1.44) 1.18 (1.05–1.32)
Covariate-adjusted hazards of changes in drug discontinuation, switching, and covariate-adjusted odds of reduced drug adherence after reaching the coverage gap
spending threshold among propensity score matched beneficiaries. Adjusted for the number of physician visits and hospitalizations, drugs used, drug spending, and
Charlson comorbidity score in the postbaseline, predoughnut hole period after PS matching for baseline characteristics, which included: age, gender, race, region of the
US, rural/urban residence, median household income, Charlson comorbidity score, number of office-based drug infusions, physician visits and hospitalizations, Medicare
Parts A and B spending, and diagnosis of cancer, RA, cardiovascular conditions (atrial or ventricular fibrillation, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, hypercholesterolemia,
myocardial infarction, angina, atherosclerosis, or congestive heart failure), depression, dementia, and/or diabetes.
an beneficiaries with at least one drug available at cohort entry.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001075.t004
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PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 9 August 2011 | Volume 8 | Issue 8 | e1001075an estimated 18,000 additional patients discontinued $one
medication because of an absence of financial assistance in the
coverage gap period. Given the potential adverse health
consequences of such discontinuations, changes to the coverage
gap’s structure are needed. The 2010 US Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s Part D provisions will eliminate the
coverage gap period incrementally by 2020, but beneficiaries
may still be at risk of decreased drug utilization and adverse
clinical consequences during that time. In contrast to blunt cost-
sharing approaches such as the coverage gap feature, more
nuanced, clinically informed insurance strategies that specifically
promote the use of drugs with high benefit and low cost may hold
the most promise for governments and insurers seeking to improve
the health of their citizens while reigning in drug costs.
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Background. Every year, more effective drugs for more
diseases become available. But the availability of so many
drugs poses a problem. How can governments provide their
citizens with access to essential medications but control
drug costs? Many different approaches have been tried,
among them the ‘‘coverage gap’’ or ‘‘donut hole’’ approach
that the US government has incorporated into its Medicare
program. Medicare is the US government’s health insurance
program for people aged 65 or older and for younger people
with specific conditions. Nearly 50 million US citizens are
enrolled in Medicare. In 2006, the government introduced a
prescription drug insurance benefit called Medicare Part D to
help patients pay for their drugs. Until recently, beneficiaries
of this scheme had to pay all their drug costs after their drug
spending reached an initial threshold in any calendar year
($2,830 in 2010). Beneficiaries remained in this coverage gap
(although people on low incomes received subsidies to help
them pay for their drugs) until their out-of-pocket spending
reached a catastrophic coverage spending threshold ($4,550
in 2010) or a new year started, after which the Part D benefit
paid for most drug costs. Importantly, the 2010 US health
reforms have mandated a gradual reduction in the amount
that Medicare Part D enrollees have to pay for their
prescriptions when they reach the coverage gap.
Why Was This Study Done? Three to four million
Medicare Part D beneficiaries reach the coverage gap every
year (nearly 15% of all Part D beneficiaries). Supporters of the
coverage gap concept argue that withdrawal of benefits
increases beneficiaries’ awareness of medication costs and
encourages switching to cost-effective therapeutic options.
However, critics argue that the coverage gap is likely to lead
to decreased drug utilization, increased use of health
services, and adverse outcomes. In this study, the
researchers examine the impact of entering the coverage
gap on drug discontinuation, switching to another drug for
the same indication, and drug adherence (whether patients
take their prescribed drugs regularly).
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
studied 663,850 Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D or
in retiree drug plans (which provide coverage under a
employer’s group health plan after retirement; the retiree
drug plans included in this study did not have coverage
gaps) who made prescription claims in 2006 and/or 2007. A
third of these individuals reached the gap spending
threshold. The researchers used detailed statistical analyses
to compare the drug discontinuation, switching, and
adherence rates of 1,993 beneficiaries who had no financial
assistance during the coverage gap (exposed beneficiaries)
with those of 9,965 matched beneficiaries who had financial
assistance during the coverage gap (unexposed). On
average, beneficiaries reached the gap spending threshold
222 days into the year (mid August). In a drug-level analysis,
exposed beneficiaries were twice as likely to discontinue a
drug and slightly more likely to have reduced drug
adherence than unexposed beneficiaries but 40% less likely
to switch a drug after reaching the threshold. Similar results
were obtained in a beneficiary-level analysis in which
discontinuation, switching, and adherence rates were
considered in terms of the complete drug regimen of
individual beneficiaries.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings show
that, among the Medicare beneficiaries investigated, a lack of
financial assistance to pay for drugs after reaching the
coverage gap spending threshold led to a doubling in the
rate of drug discontinuation and a slight reduction in drug
adherence. Surprisingly, lack of financial assistance resulted
in a decrease in drug switching even though the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services advise patients to consider
switching to generic or low-cost drugs. Importantly, the
researchers estimate that, for the whole Medicare
population, the lack of financial assistance to pay for drugs
could result in an additional 18,000 patients discontinuing
one or more prescription drug per year. Although this study
did not directly investigate the effect of the coverage gap on
patient outcomes, these findings suggest that this and other
blunt cost-containment approaches could adversely affect
health outcomes through their effects on drug utilization.
Thus, insurance strategies that specifically promote the use
of drugs with high benefit but low cost might be a better
approach for governments seeking to improve the health of
their citizens while reining in drug costs.
Additional Information. Please access these websites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001075.
N The US Department of Health and Human Services Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid provides information on all
aspects of Medicare, including general advice on bridging
the coverage gap and an information sheet on bridging
the coverage gap in 2011
N Medicare.gov, the official US government website for
Medicare, provides information on all aspects of Medicare
(in English and Spanish), including a description of Part D
prescription drug coverage
N An information sheet from the Kaiser Family Foundation
explains the key changes to the Medicare Part D drug
benefit coverage gap that were introduced in the 2010
health care reforms
N MedlinePlus provides links to further information about
Medicare (in English and Spanish)
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